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RECENT CASES
Conflict of Laws-Validity of Testamentary Trust for Perpetual
Upkeep of Grave Governed by Law of Place of AdministrationTestator, domiciled in Delaware, made a bequest to a Pennsylvania cemetery corporation to be administered by the corporation for the perpetual
care of family burial lots in Pennsylvania. While the trust would be void
under Delaware law because perpetual,1 it would be valid in Pennsylvania
by statute.2 Held, since the trust is to be administered in Pennsylvania,
Pennsylvania law controls, and the trust is valid. State, for Use of Woodlands Cemetery Co. of Philadelphiav. Lodge, I6 A. (2d) 250 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1940).
The validity and effect of a testamentary trust of personalty 3 is in general tested by the domiciliary law of the testator.4 Where the trust is to
be administered in a state other than that of the testator's domicil, some
cases have held the law of the testator's domicil controlling,5 while others
have held that the law of the place of administration of the trust governs.6
The explanation of this inconsistency may be found in the desire of the
courts to carry out the intent of the testator and sustain the trust by applying the law favorable to its validity.7 The rule against perpetuities, s however, is clearly a matter of concern only to the state in which the trust is
to be administered in perpetuity.9 The rule is aimed at preventing the
I. See instant case at 251.

Delaware evidently follows the common law view that a

bequest for the upkeep of a grave is invalid if perpetual. I ScOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
(939) § 124.
2. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193I) tit. 9, § 4. Section 4 provides that such a bequest shall not fail because made in perpetuity but that it shall be held to be made for
a charitable use. The act has been held to remove the trust from the rule against perpetuities, but not to make it a charitable one, Deaner's Estate, 98 Pa. Super. Ct. 36o
(930).
This provision is an exception to the common law view on holdings of personalty in perpetuity. Although such trusts are always held non-charitable in nature,
the same reasoning as to the conflicts problem should apply whether the trust be construed as charitable or non-charitable. I Scorr, loc. cit. supra note I.
3. The distinction between testamentary and inter vivos trusts should be observed,
Notes (1941) 89 U. OF PA. L. RLv. 36o, at 361; (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. goi.
4. Jones v. Habersham, 107 U. S. 174, 179 (i882) ; 2 BPAE, THE CONFLICT OF

§294.7; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934)
RICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1938) § 164.
LAws (935)

§§295, 306; GOOD-

5. Whitney v. Dodge, IO5 Cal. 192, 38 Pac. 636 (894) ; Dammert v. Osborn, 140
N. Y. 30, 35 N. E. 407 (1893) ; rehearing denied, 141 N. Y. 564, 35 N. E. io88 (i894) ;
Cross v. United States Trust Co., I3X N. Y. 330, 3o N. E. 125 (1892) ; 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 295; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 164.
6. In re Tabbagh's Estate, 167 Misc. i56, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 5V (Surr. Ct. 1938);
Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 43 N. Y. 424, 3o N. E. 125 (87); Manice v. Manice,
43 N. Y. 303 (1871) ; Lanius v. Fletcher, ioo Tex. 550, 101 S. W. io76 (io7) ; In re
Chappell's Estate, 124 Wash. 128, 213 Pac. 684 (1923). (By place of administration
the courts usually refer to a combination of the domicil of the trustee, the physical location of the res, and where the trust is carried on. In the instant case all three of these
operative facts indicate that the place of administration is in Pennsylvania.)
7. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 164; LAND, TRUSTS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAws
(1940) §§ 18, I9 (Land calls this result "an alternative reference rule" which is used
to uphold the gift.) ; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws, N. Y. ANNOT. (I935) §§295,
3o6. No case has been found in which a testamentary trust has not been upheld if there
is a law which will sustain it.
8. The term "rule against perpetuities" as used refers to the rules in the two states
against the restraints on alienation of property. There is no problem here as to the
rules as to when or within what time property must vest.
9. Instant case at 25o ("the question is of legitimate interest only to the state
where the property is to be received and held.").
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holding,1 and not the giving, of personalty for periods of time which are
contrary to the public policy of the state where the property is held. 1 The
law of the place of the administration of the trust should, therefore, be
applied in every case involving this rule.' 2 Where, as in the instant case,
the trust violates the domiciliary rule as to holding in perpetuity but is valid
under the law of the place of administration, the recognized policy of enforcing the bequest if possible can also be effectuated.' 3 However, even if
the trust could not be upheld, 4the rule against perpetuities of the place of
administration should control.

Constitutional Law-Federal Jurisdiction over Navigable Waters

Extended to Rivers Improvable at Reasonable Cost-United States
sued to enjoin construction of defendant's dam as obstruction to a navigable
river.' Held, (reversing district 2 and circuit I courts on the issue of navigability) injunction granted. The river is navigable in law because it could
be made so in fact at reasonable cost, United States v. Appalachian Elec.
Power Co., 61 Sup. Ct. 291 (U. S. 194o), petition for rehearing denied,
Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Jan. 21, 1941, p. I, col. I.
The constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce 4 includes
power to forbid or license a dam in waters used for interstate navigation. 5
io. The Delaware law limited the holding of the trust whereas the Pennsylvania
law allowed it as a charitable trust to be held forever.
ii. See Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 186 Atl. 903, 910 (Del.
Ch. 1936). See also GOODRICH, CoxFLIcr o0 LAWS, § 164; LAND, loc. cit. supra note
7; Cavers, Trusts Inter Vivos and the Conflict of Laws (930) 44 HARV. L. REy. 161,
165, 166; Note (1941) 89 U. oF PA. L. REy. 360, 368 ("the validity of the trust depends
not upon the creation, but whether the trust can be validly carried out at the place of
administration.")
12. See cases cited supra note 6.
13. The New York Courts have in every case held the trust valid. RESTATEmENT,
CONFLicr OF LAWS, N. Y. ANN0T. (1935) §§ 295, 306.
14. If the law of the place of administration would always control when the rule
against perpetuities is involved, the testator's domiciliary court should hold the trust
invalid if it would be invalid under the law of the place of administration even though
the trust would be valid under domiciliary law. This would be a logical view. Note
(1941) 89 U. OF PA. L. REv. 36o, 369. See also CAvRs, loc. cit. supra note ii. New
York in such a case holds the trust valid. This may be explained by New York's policy of upholding the gift whenever possible or by their recognized antipathy to their
own rule against perpetuities. RE,STATE!IENT, CoNL.icT or LAs, N. Y. ANNTr.
(1935) §§ 295, 306 (New York has consistently enforced trusts valid by foreign domiciliary law, but invalid under New York law even in cases where the trust is to be
administered in New York. This result is also to be explained by their antipathy to
their own strict rule against perpetuities.). See also in support of the view that the
law of the place of administration should be applied in every case. RESTATEMENT,
CoNFiCT oF LAvs, CAL. ANNOT. (2939) §295 (". . . the rule rests upon comity . . .)
2. Forty-one states joined as amid curiae in support of defendant, arguing that the
proposed control would infringe their rights under the Tenth Amendment.
2. The United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 23 F. Supp. 83 (W. D. Va.
1938).
3. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 2O7 F. (2d) 769 (C. C. A. 4 th,
1939).
4. U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

5. Willson v. The Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245 (U. S. 1824); Rivers
and Harbors Act of 1899, 30 STAT. 1151 (1899), 33 U. S. C. A. §§401, 403 (1928). The
power extends to dams in non-navigable tributaries which affect navigation downstream, United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Co., 174 U. S. 69o (1899).
For general treatment of federal authority over public waters see Carman, The Riddle
of Governmental Power in the Use of Public Waters (March, 1931) Coamm. L. J.
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By the Federal Water Power Act 6 Congress delegated this authority to
the Federal Power Commission, prescribing as terms of the license to be
granted that the dam shall be adapted to a comprehensive plan of development, 7 and shall revert to the United States at the expiration of the fiftyyear license at a price fixed by the Act.8 The defendant contested the
Commission's jurisdiction over its project, arguing that navigability was
a question of fact 9 found in its favor by two lower courts and therefore
not reviewable except for clear error. 10 The Court did not question the
correctness of the physical data established below, but held that the test for
navigability was reviewable as a question of law," especially since here it
involved the scope of federal authority under the Constitution.' Applying
an entirely new 13 test, the Court held that although the river was not in
fact navigable in its present state, it could be made so by improvements at
reasonable 1 cost; therefore it was navigable in law. Defendants further
objected to license provisions for recapture as unconnected with navigation, 5 relying on the settled rule that Congress may not exercise forbidden powers indirectly. 16 Admitting that the provisions did not affect
boat and water navigation,' 7 the Court justified them on the grounds that
the power to forbid entails the power to license on any terms, 8 even if they
6. 41 STAT. 1077 (1920), amended in 49 STAT. 838 (1935), 16 U. S. C. A. §79i et
seq. (Supp. 1940), now known as the Federal Power Act. Citations hereafter are to
sections of the act as amended.
7. Section io (a).

8. Section 14. The defendant also argued that this provision allowed confiscation
without compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
9. Relying on the classic definition in The Daniel Ball, io Wall. 557, 563 (U. S.
I87O), "Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are
navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when . . . used . . . or susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce .
Accord, e. g., The Montello, 20 Wall. 430 (U. S. 1874) ; Leovy v. United States, 177
U. S. 621 (igoo). Cf. the definition in the Federal Power Act, § 3 (8), ". . . 'navigable waters' means those . . . which either in their natural or improved condition
. . . are used or suitable for use for . . . interstate . . . commerce .
io. This is a general rule based on the trial court's opportunity to weigh credibility
of evidence, Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U. S. 464 (938). It was applied to the
issue of navigability in Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U. S. 77
(1922); cf. FED. RULES CIV. PR0c., Rule 52.

ii. To support this position the Court cited United States v. Rio Grande Dam and
Irrigation Co., 174 U. S. 69o (1899) ; Leovy v. United States, 177 U. S. 621 (Igoo) ;
Economy Light Co. v. United States, 256 U. S. 113 (1921); United States v. Holt
State Bank, 270 U. S. 49 (1926) (all cited in majority opinion, instant case, n. 12).
The dissenting opinion correctly pointed out that none directly supports the proposition
for which they are cited, though there is a dictum in accord, see United States v. Holt
State Bank, 270 U. S. 49, 56 (1926).
12. The theory that a so-called "Constitutional fact", on which federal jurisdiction depends, is more sacred than other facts was announced in Crowell v. Benson, 285

U. S. 22 (1932). For an analysis and criticism see Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson:
.Judicial Review of Administrative .Determinations of Questions of "Constitntional
Fact" (1932) 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1055. The instant case, of course, involved review
of a finding by the trial court, not an administrative body. The Power Commission,
after vacillating several times, declined to pass on the question of navigability.
13. The dissenting opinion reveals the complete lack of precedent for this test.
14. For the cost to be reasonable "There must be a balance between cost and need
at a time when the improvement would be useful." Instant case at p. 299. This standard is illusory in the case at bar. When improvements would have been useful, the
cost was found impracticable, majority opinion, instant case at p. 304. There is no
possibility of future improvement, since there are dams without locks above and below
defendant's, 107 F. (2d) 769, 784 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939).
15. Instant case at 304.
16. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 315, 423 (U. S. 1819).
17. Instant case at 307.
18. Instant case at 309.
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amount to confiscation.19 Theoretically, the defendant was not forced to
accept the license; it could have removed the dam. Practically, that alternative was not open, since defendant had already spent several million dollars. 20 Apparently recognizing that defendant was economically bound to
take a license, the Court further justified its provisions by holding that
commerce includes flood control and utilization of power.21 The holding
may be justified in the instant case, where the dam was one of the thirty
largest in the country 22 with a planned transmission through several
states. 2 Its practical result is to broaden the definition of interstate commerce to include sources of interstate electric power. 24 This would have
appeared more clearly if the court had found federal jurisdiction on that
basis, instead of relying on a purely hypothetical availability for navigation.

Corporations-Statutory

Liability of Shareholders for Wages

Owed by Corporation Unaffected by Bankruptcy ProceedingsThree months after issuance of an order in reorganization proceedings

restraining suits against the corporation, plaintiff sued the corporation 1

and individual shareholders, under a state statute 2 imposing six-month
limitation on such action, for wages unpaid over a period of nine months.
Since joinder of corporation and shareholders is mandatory in wage suits,
plaintiff claimed the limitation was barred by the bankruptcy court order
and also by that provision of the Bankruptcy Act2 which suspends statutes of limitation. Held, plaintiff may recover wages owed only during
six months before suit since the Bankruptcy Act provision was inapplicable
and since he might have begun suit against shareholders alone 4 and then
ig. Fox River Co. v. Railroad Comm'r, 274 U. S. 65, (1926).
2o. Petition for rehearing, instant case, at 15. A footnote points out that the dam
involved in Economy Light Co. v. United States, 256 U. S. 13 (1921) was hardly
begun during the case, and was never finished.
21. Instant case at 208.
22. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., io7 F. (2d) 769, 798 (C. C. A.
4th, 1939).

23. Brief for Petitioner, p. I25, instant case. The interstate transmission of electricity is within the power to regulate commerce, Electric Bond and Share Co. v.
S. E. C., 303 U. S. 419, 433 (1938); Public Utilities Comm'n of R. I. v. Attleboro
Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U. S. 83, 86 (i927).
24. This holding would by implication reverse Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost,
286 U. S. 165 (932), where the Court distinguished the generation of electric power
from its transmission, and held a generating plant subject to state taxation.
i. Although the sheriff, in compliance with the restraining order, did not serve
the corporation, the injunction was later modified and the crporation voluntarily appeared.
2. 1933 P. L. 364, § 514, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1938) tit. i5, § 2852-514,
amended by 1935 P. L. 1123, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1938) tit. 15, §2852-514.
Clause A, in giving the right of action against a shareholder, reads: ". . . but no
shareholder shall be so liable unless suit for the collection of such salaries and wages
shall be brought against him within six months after the same shall become due."
3. Suit was brought in i935, § 77B of the National Bankruptcy Act of 1898 being
then in effect. 48 STAT. 912 (1934). The relevant part of § 77B (b) (io) was as follows: "The running of all periods of time prescribed by any other provisions of
this Act, and by all statutes of limitations, shall be suspended during the pendency of a
proceeding under this section."
4. The court said mere service of original process on shareholders alone would have
been sufficient institution of suit to comply with the Pennsylvania statute. Instant case
at 730.
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petitioned bankruptcy court for leave to join corporation.5 Eiffert v. Pennsylvania Central Brewing Co., 15 A. (2d) 723 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1940).
The precise question involved in the instant case has apparently never
been litigated before, at least in Pennsylvania. However, on the basis of
analogous decisions the result here appears to be correct from a purely legal
standpoint. It is true that the Bankruptcy Act takes precedence over
conflicting state laws on the subject 6 and that it suspends state statutes
of limitations.7 As the state court pointed out," however, the time limit
provision in the Pennsylvania statute is not an ordinary statute of limitations but rather an integral part of the cause of action given by the act.
Where a right unknown to the common law is created by a statute and in
conjunction therewith a time limit is imposed within which that right
must be enforced, most courts hold that the life of the right is defined by
the time provision and that on the expiration of the period stated not only
is the remedy barred but the cause of action itself no longer exists.9 Since
Congress cannot enlarge the substantive rights given wage claimants by
the state legislature, 10 and since the statute in question concerned merely
the liability of shareholders, not of the bankrupt corporation,1" the logic
of the court's holding that the Bankruptcy Act did not apply is unassailable. There is less authority for the court's decision that plaintiff should
first have served process on the shareholders, thereby complying with the
statute, and then have petitioned the bankruptcy court for modification of
its preliminary injunction.' 2 Much depends on which of two conflicting,
policies is to be preferred. That there is definite feeling that wage earners
should be afforded special protection is shown by legislative enactments' 3
5. The court also upheld the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania statute, which
defendants had attacked upon an appeal which was consolidated with plaintiff's appeal.
6. U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U. S. 261
(1929); see Mulder and Solomon, Effect of the Chandler Act Upois General Assigninents and Compositions (1939) 87 U. oF PA.L. REV. 782, n. 1O2. But it is only where
state laws actually conflict with the National Bankruptcy Act that they are suspended
by it. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. 4136 Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U. S. 120 (1937) ;
see Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U. S.605 (ii8), at 613: ". . . state laws are thus
suspended only to the extent of actual conflict with the system provided by the Bankruptcy Act olf Congress." See also Mulder and Solomon, supra, at 782, n. 1O3.
7. See note 3 sipra.
8. Instant case at 728.
9.The usual situation in which such a question arises is in cases involving conflict of laws. The Harrisburg, xig U. S. i99 (1886); Ford, Bacon & Davis, Inc. v.
Volentine, 64 F. (2d) 8oo (C. C. A. 5th, 1933) ; Moran v. Harrison, 91 F. (2d) 310
(App. D. C. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 740 (1937); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1934) § 6o5. See The Harrisburg, supra at 214: "The statutes create a new
legal liability. . . . The time within which the suit must be brought operates as a
limitation of the liability itself as created, and not of the remedy alone." Cf. Guy v.
Stocklein Baking Co., 133 Pa. Super. 38, 1 A. (2d) 839 (1938) (suit on Workmen's
Compensation claim).
IO.The nature, extent and conditions of the liability of a shareholder are determined by the law of the state of incorporation. Harrigan v. Bergdoll, 270 U. S.56o
(x926) (assessment on unpaid stock) ; Moran v. Harrison, 91 F. (2d) 310 (App. D. C.
1937) (statutory double liability) ; It re Mfrs.' Box & Lumber Co., 251 Fed. 957 (D.
C. N. J. 1918) (assessment on unpaid stock) ; 13 FLETCrER, Cyc. CoRn'. (Penn. ed.
1932)

§ 6227.

ii.Cf. In re Diversey Bldg. Corp., 86 F. (2d) 456 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936).
12. Cf. Mansfield Iron Works v. Wilcox, 52 Pa. 377 (1866). Here plaintiff sued un-

der statute of 1849 similar to the one in the instant case without joining the corporation.
On appeal he was allowed to amend and join the corporation. Also cf. United Glass
Co. v. Vary, 152 N. Y. 121 (1897), where corporate creditor was not allowed to sue
shareholders alone without showing he had first attempted to procure a modification of
a preliminary injunction prohibiting actions against the corporation.
13. Aside from Pennsylvania various states have acts on the subject. For example, see 2 MASS. GEN. LAws (1932) c. 156, § 35; N. Y. Cors. LAws (Cahill, 193o)
c. 60, §71.
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allowing them recovery from shareholders and also by provisions in the
Bankruptcy Act '14giving such a class priority in claims. On the other
hand, since the liability of a shareholder is in derogation of the common
law, it should be strictly construed. 15 The policy favoring wage earners
seems the stronger of the two and on the special facts of the principal case
would lead to a more equitable result. 6 Under the present decision plaintiff is left with an unsecured claim against the bankrupt corporation for
performing services by which the shareholders benefited.
Defamation-Liability Where Statement is True of Whom it
Was Written, but Untrue as to a Third Party-The defendants stated
in their newspaper that "Harold Newstead, a 3o-year-old Camberwell
man . . ." had been convicted of bigamy. This statement was true of
Harold Newstead, a barman of Crofton Road, Camberwell to whom it
was intended to refer, but was not true of the plaintiff, Harold Newstead,
a hairdresser of Camberwell Road, Camberwell. On the plaintiff's suit for
libel the damages were fixed at one farthing and the defendant appealed.
Held (MacKinnon L. J. dissenting),' the fact that the words complained
of were intended to refer to, and were true of an existing person, did not
as a matter of law make it impossible for them to be defamatory of another and if from a reasonable construction of the statement the plaintiff
is designated, he may recover. Newstead v. London Express Newspaper

Ltd. [194o] i K. B. 377.
Both England and the majority of American jurisdictions have long
recognized two principles as well established in the law of defamation.
First, assuming that the statement is in fact defamatory,2 liability depends
14. 52 STAT. 874 (1938), 11 U. S. C. A. § lO4 (1939).
15. See Schramm v. Done, 135 Ore. 16, 26, 293 Pac. 931, 934 (930). But cf. State
Savings Assn. of St. Louis v. Kellogg, 52 Mo. 583 (1873); see Clokus v. Hollister
Mining Co., 92 Wis. 325, 327, 66 N. W. 398 (1896).
16. In reaching a decision contrary to that handed down, the instant court would
probably not have done more violence to the wording of the Pennsylvania statute than
a federal court did with reference to the Bankruptcy Act. Section 64 (b) (5) of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 provided for priority in payment of wages earned "within
three months before the date of the- commencement of the proceeding". In In re Reliable Furniture Mfg. Co., 32 F. (2d) 8o5 (D. C. Md. 1929), aff'd sub nom., Manly
v. Hood, 37 F. (2d) 212 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930) it was held that "commencement of the
proceeding" referred to institution of state receivership proceedings; which was the act
of bankruptcy involved. Such a holding forcibly illustrates the policy of "stretching
it a point" in favor of wage earners.
i.The Lord Justice was in substantial agreement with the court on the points of
law involved but he seriously doubted that there was sufficient evidence to allow the
question of whether the statement could reasonably be understood to refer to the plaintiff to go to the jury. He actually dissented, however, on the grounds that as the damages were assessed at one farthing, and since he could not conceive of any jury arriving at a higher figure, a further trial of the case would serve no real purpose. See
instant case at 288, 393 (dissenting opinion).
2. The same general rules are applied to determine the meaning of the words
as to determine the identity of the person referred to. The plaintiff need only
show that by virtue of the surrounding circumstances the publication in fact conveyed a defamatory meaning. Morrison v. Ritchie & Co., 39 Scot. L. R.
432 (I9O2), where the newspaper was held liable for publishing a notice of the
birth of twins to a couple who, unknown to the publisher, had been married
only two months. Cassidy v. Daily Mirror Newspaper Ltd., 11929] 2 K. B. 331;
(1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. Rzv. 568, where a newspaper published a statement that Mr.
C. and Miss X had announced their engagement when in fact Mr. C. was married and
living with Mrs. C., the plaintiff. Mrs. C. alleged that the statement conveyed to reasonable people an aspersion on her character and was allowed recovery. GATLvY,
LiBEL AND SLANDER (3d ed. 1938) 21.
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solely on an "objective" test, 3 that is, was the publication reasonably understood to refer to the plaintiff.4 The intent 5 or malice 1 of the defendant
are immaterial. Secondly, truth has long been considered a complete defense to an action for defamation.7 The instant case is the first in which
an English court has been faced with a direct conflict of these principles.,
On the facts of the case it appears that the court had three alternatives. 9
Either to hold for the defendant on the basis that truth was a complete
defense, or to hold for the plaintiff on the basis of the defendant's negligence in failing to state the prisoner's occupation and address, 10 or to hold
the defendant liable on the basis of an absolute liability. The court was
undoubtedly correct in holding that truth as to a third party was no defense. This defense is allowed, not because any merit is attached to the
publisher's disclosure, but on the theory that the plaintiff, having committed a wrong, has no right to complain of its publication." Here, as the
plaintiff is innocent, he does have a right to complain and the defense must
fail. As to whether the defendant's liability should be founded on negligence or on absolute liability 12 the court took the position that it was the
injury to the innocent plaintiff and not any wrongful act of the defendant
which constituted the real basis of liability and that the question of negligence was therefore immaterial. 3 The exercise of due care may decrease
the damages allowed 14 or the possibility that the statement can reasonably
be understood to refer to a third party, 5 but it will not of itself defeat a
plaintiff's claim. It has been urged that serious hardship may result from
placing liability on defendants who have acted neither negligently nor
3. "This standard is 'objective' in that it interprets the words in the sense in which
they are reasonably understood, rather than in that which they were meant." Note
(1925) 38 HARv. L. REv. 1oo.
4. E. Hulton & Co. v. Jones, [igio] A. C. 2o; Lee v. Wilson and Mackinnon, 51
C. L. R. 276 (Aust. 1934); Washington Post Co. v. Kennedy, 3 F. (2d) 207 (App.
D. C. 3925) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 579, comment a, "the question is not who
is intended, but who is reasonably understood to be intended; not 'who is meant, but
who is hit'."
5. (i93o) 46 L. Q. Rlv. 1, 2, where Sir Frederick Pollock in speaking of the case
of Hulton v. Jones states, "The principle of that decision (whether one likes it or not)
is that liability for libel does not depend on the intention of the defamer but on the fact
of defamation: . . ." To the same effect see RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 58o.
6. HARPER, TORTS (1933) § 237; GATLEY, op. cit. supra note 2 at 7.
7. Ray, Truth: A Defense to Libel (i931) i6 MINN. L. REv. 43, 5o, where he
states: "So it can safely be said that with the beginning of the nineteenth century the
rule making truth a complete defense in a civil proceeding had become firmly established in the common law courts."
8. "There is no reported case of a true statement having been held to constitute an
actionable libel, so far as English courts are concerned." (940) 18 CAN. B. REv. 332.
9. The question of whether this publication might not have been privileged as
being a report of a judicial proceeding was neither raised by counsel nor discussed by
the court. It would seem that any attempt to raise such a defense could be defeated
by the fact that this report was not a full one since it failed to give the prisoner's
address or occupation. HARPER, TORTS (1933) § 250, where it is stated, ". . . in
England . . . reports of judicial proceedings are privileged at common law, if the
report is full and fair." To the same effect see GATLEY, op. cit. supra note 2 at 337.
IO. Instant case at 378.
ii. POLLOCK, TORTS (i4th ed. 1939) 206. For a complete discussion of truth as
a defense see Ray, Truth: A Defense to Libel (ig3i) 16 MINN. L. REV. 43.
32. For an excellent discussion of this general proposition as raised in Hulton v.
Jones, see Jeremiah Smith, Jones v. Hulton: Three Conflicting Judicial Views as to a
Question of Defamation (1912) 6o U. OF PA. L. REV. 365 and 461.
13. Instant case at 389; I8 CAN. B. REv. 132, 134 (1940) ; Cassidy v. Daily Mirror
Newspaper, Ltd., [1929] 2 K. B. 331, 354.
14. GATLEY, op. cit. supra note 2 at 7; E. Hulton & Co. v. Jones, [39o9] 2 K. B.

444, 479.

15. 7 CAXB. L. REv. 275, 276.
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maliciously,1" but it should also be noted that if such were not the rule
innocent parties who were injured by the publisher's
without redress.1 7 A plaintiff's reputation can be as
by an innocent libel as by an intentional or negligent one
only right that the party creating this risk should bear

actions would be
seriously injured
and it would seem
any loss accruing

from it.18

Labor Law-Necessity for Written Agreement under the Wagner
Act-N: L. R. B. ordered employer to sign a writing embodying a
contract previously reached with the union. Held, petition to enforce the
order granted. The refusal to sign was a refusal to bargain collectively, 1
and the action of the Board was proper. H. J.Heinz Co. v. N. L. R. B.,
61 Sup. Ct. 320 (1941).
This final phase of the duty to bargain collectively, not required by
express statutory language, has now been removed from the area of dispute 2
to the field of settled law. Binding oral agreements are not necessarily precluded, but at least upon request, the union has the right to have reduced to
writing any contract which it reaches with the employer. And it is intimated that a reservation against signing at the outset of negotiations would
be a refusal to bargain collectively.3 The Act does not compel the parties
to reach an agreement. 4 Both employer and union are free to refuse or
exact concessions in wages, hours, and working conditions.5 But as the
instant court pointed out, this freedom extends merely to the substantive
terms of the negotiations, not to their expression in any particular form.'
16. Notes (1gog) 58 U. OF PA. L. REV. 166, i6g; (1925) 38 HA~v. L. Rxv. 1IOO.
17. Smith, Jones v. Hulton: Three Conflicting Judicial Views as to a Question of
Defamation (1912) 6o U. OF PA. L. REV. 365, 474.
18. HARPER, ToRTs (1933) § 237, P. 505, where it is stated, "It is submitted that
losses of this nature may very well be regarded by the law as one of the expenses of
the undertaking which caused it. To the same effect see (1940) 7 CAmB. L. REv. 275,
276.
i. Section 8 (5) of the NATIONAL LARO RELATioiqs Acr, 49 STAT. 452 (1935),
U. S. C. A. § I58 (Supp. 1940).

29

Six other courts of appeals had passed upon the question. The problem first
arose in the seventh circuit, which held that it was not necessary to embody in a written
agreement terms which already had, or might be, reached. Fort Wayne Corrugated
Paper Co. v. N. L. R. B., iii F. (2d) 869 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940); Inland Steel Co. v.
N. L. R. B., lo9 F. (2d) 9 (C. C. A. 7th, 194o). However, five of the remaining circuits reached the contrary result. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., Ltd. v. N. L. R. B.,
II4 F. (2d) 930 (C. C. A. Ist, 1940) ; Art Metals Construction Co. v. N. L. R. B., ino
F. (2d) 148 (C. C. A. 2d, 194o) ; N. L. R. B. v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., iio F. (2d)
632 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1940); Wilson & Co., Inc. v. N. L. R. B., 115 F. (2d) 759 (C. C.
A. 8th, i94o); Continental Oil Co. v. N. L. R. B., 113 F. (2d) 473 (C. C. A. ioth,
2.

1940).

3. Instant case at 325, 326.
4. N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 3Ol U. S.

I, 45 (1937). "The law
does not require any employer to sign any agreement of any kind. Congress has no
power to impose such a requirement. An agreement presupposes mutual consent. The
law merely requires that an employer bargain collectively with his workers, which
means that he shall receive their representatives and engage in a fair discussion, in the
hope that terms may be voluntarily agreed upon by both sides without recourse to
strife." Senator Wagner, quoted in Inland Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B., log F. (2d) 9 at
24 (1940).

5.Art Metals Construction Co. v. N. L. R. B., iio F. (2d) 148 (C. C. A. 2d,

1940).

6. Cf. Nat. Aniline & Chemical Co., i N. L. R. B. (o.s.) i14, 116 (1934), in
which it was said that ". . . (collective bargaining) requires employers to go further
than merely to receive the duly constituted representatives of their employees, to give
ear to their demands and to assent to such demands if satisfactory. The statute im-
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It has been argued that since the Act does not specifically provide for written agreements, they constitute a subject for collective bargaining like any
other request.7 Rejecting this argument, the Court relied on the "precedent" of labor boards under previous statutes, which ruled that a written
the legislacontract was the final step in the bargaining process," although
9
tion under which they acted did not conclusively require this. There is no
doubt as to the wisdom of the decision. It is little to require of the employer that he grant the union the same type of contract he uses in ordinary
business dealings. A permanent memorandum of the terms and conditions
so that neither party may put in jeopardy what each has agreed
is desirable
0
to.'

Mortgages-Right to Rent upon Default-Mortgagee1 notified
mortgagor that it took possession of the mortgaged property and demanded that the tenant, in possession under a lease made after the mortgage, pay all rent to it. Upon refusal, mortgagee seeks an order directing
the tenant to pay rent to it. Held, that to "acquire the right to denmand
payment of rent to the mortgagee there must be an entry and taking of
possession by the mortgagee." Peoples-PittsburghTrust Co. v. Henshaw,
15 A. (2d) 711 (Pa. Super. I94O).
In "lien states", 2 a right to possession in the mortgagee does not arise
until after foreclosure and sale and a default does not affect the mortgaThese jurisdictions, howgor's right to collect the rents and profits.3
ever, are rather liberal in the appointment of receivers to collect the rents
poses duties consistent with its purpose. It contemplates that the demands of the employees or the modification of such demands if acceptable to the employer be embodied
in an agreement and that such agreement bind both parties for a certain period of
time. . . ." For substantially similar language see Consolidated Edison Co. v. N. L.
R. B., 305 U. S. 197, 236 (1938) ; N. L. R. B. v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U. S. 332, 342
(939).
7. This was the position taken in Inland Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B., iog F. (2d) 9
(C. C. A. 7th, 1940) ; see Chase, J., dissenting, in Art Metals Construction Co. v. N. L.
R. B., lXO F. (2d) 148, 152 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
8. The National Labor Board, created to administer section 7 (a) of the N. I.
R. A., 48 STAT. 195 (1933), held that the duty to bargain collectively imposed by that
section included an obligation to embody agreed terms in a signed agreement. Connecticut Coke Co., 2 N. L. B. 88 (1934); Harriman Hosiery Mills, I N. L. B. 68
Its successor, the first N. L. R. B., did likewise. Nat. Aniline & Chemical
(934).
Co., i N. L. R. B. (o.s.) 114 (1934).
9.With the N. L. R. B. expressly in mind, Congress provided in amendments to
the MERCHANT MARINE Acr, 52 STAT. 966 (1938), 46 U. S. C. A. § 1254 (Supp. 1940),
that the Maritime Labor Board shall encourage all maritime employers and employees
to exert every reasonable effort "to make and maintain written. agreements concerning
rates of pay, hours of employment, rules, and working conditions.

. .

."

(Italics

added.)
546.

5o. See Saposs and Gamin, Rapid Increase in Contracts (1939) 4

LAB.

RE..

REP.

i. There was no formal entry by the mortgagee in this case.
2. For a discussion of the lien theory, which treats a mortgage merely as a
security device, see Lloyd, Mortgages-The Genesis of the Lien Theory (1923) 32
YALE L. J. 233.
149

3. Price v. Dowdy, 34 Ark. 285 (1879) ; Sweet & Clark Co. v. Union Nat. Bk.,
Ind. 305, 49 N. E. 159 (1898); First Trust Joint Stock Bk. v. Beall, 208 Iowa

1107, 225 N. W. 943 (1929); Hogsett v. Ellis, 17 Mich. 351 (1868); Marshall &
Illsley Bk. v. Cady, 75 Minn. 241, 77 N. W. 831 (1899) ; Grady v. First State Security
Co., 179 Minn. 571, 229 N. W. 874 (193o); Allen v. Pullam, 223 Mo. App. 1053,
I0 S. W. (2d) 64 (1928); I JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 16.
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pending foreclosure. 4 In "title states", 5 the title, as between the parties,
is in the mortgagees to the extent that it is necessary to render the instrument effective as a security device. 6 Thus, a right of possession is given
the mortgagee after default and he may maintain ejectment for it. 7 When
the lease precedes the mortgage, the mortgage operates as an assignment
of the mortgagor's (lessor's) reversionary interest 8 and this assignment
transfers the legal title to the rent for which the mortgagee can assert his
9

right at any time.
Should there be a default, mere notice to the tenant
is sufficient to cut off the mortgagor's right to collect rents. 10 The tenant
must respect the demand of the mortgagee in such a case because the latter
has the right to distrain for the rent. 1 ' But where the lease occurs after
the mortgage the legal significance of the transaction is entirely different.
The mortgagee cannot exercise the right of a landlord against the tenant
because privity is not created as in the situation where the mortgage operated as an assignment. 12 He can, however, exercise the same rights
against the tenant that he could have exercised against the mortgagor since
he acquired his interest first and it is superior to the right of the tenant.'"
In this situation, the mortgagee also has a right to possession upon default 14 and to the rents and profits incident thereto. Should the tenant,
in order to avoid ejectment, agree to pay the mortgagee, that agreement
will bar collection of the rent by the mortgagor.' 5 In doing this the tenant is recognizing the mortgagor's superior interest and a new tenancy
is established without the necessity of an entry by the mortgagee. 6 If the
tenant refuses to attorn, the mortgagee cannot distrain for the rent. 7 Although most jurisdictions will permit the appointment of a receiver, 8 this
is not the case in Pennsylvania because the legal remedy is deemed ade4. Totten v. Harlowe, go F. (2d) 377 (App. D. C. 1937) ; Price v. Dowdy, 34
Ark. 285 (1879) ; Nusbaum v. Shapero, 249 Mich. 252, 228 N. W. 785 (1930) ; Windom National Bk. v. Reno, 172 Minn. 193, 274 N. W. 886 (1927); Manhattan Life

Ins. Co. v. Hammerstein Opera Co., i8o App. Div. 69, 167 N. Y. Supp. 245 (ist Dep't
1917) ; cf. Cortleyeu v. Hathaway, ii N. J. Eq. 39 (855).
5. See Lloyd, The Mortgage Theory of Pennsylvania (1924) 73 U. OF PA. L.

Ray. 43.

6. Id. at 57; Presbyterian Corp. v. Wallace, 3 Rawle 109, 127 (Pa. i83i).
7. Zimmern v. Peoples' Bank, 203 Ala. 22, 81 So. 811 (igig); Hagerstown v.
Groh, 1o Md. 56o, 61 Atl. 467 -(io5) ; Fluck v. Replogle, 13 Pa. 405 (i85o) ;
Bulger v. Wilderman, ioi Pa. Super. 168 (ig3i) ; see Randal v. Jersey Mortgage
Inv. Co., 3o6 Pa. I, 5, i58 Atl. 865, 866 (1932).
8. King v. Houstanic Ry., 45 Conn. 226 (1877); Burden V. Thayer, 44 Mass.
76 (1841) ; McDonald v. Roth, ig Erie 87, 51 York 22 (Pa. 1937) ; 2 JONES, op. cit.
supra note 3, § 978.
9. See 2 JONES, op. cit. supra note 3, § 1425 et seq.

io. Burden v. Thayer, 44 Mass. 76 (0841).
ii. See 2 JONES, op. cit. upra note 3, § 98o. But cf. Myers v. White, i Rawle
353, 355 (Pa.
At.

1829).

12. Merchants' Union Trust Co.
52o (1912); Burke v. Willard,

v. New Phila. Graphite Co.,

7o

Del. Ch. 18, 83

243 Mass. 547, 137 N. E. 744 (1923).
13. McKircher v. Hawley, 16 Johns 289 (N. Y. i8i9); i TFFANY, LANDLORD
AND TENANT (i910) § 73 (a).
14. See note 6 supra.
15. Randal v. Jersey Mortgage Inv. Co., 3o6 Pa. i, 158 Atl. 865 (1932) ; Bulger
v. Wilderman, 1o Pa. Super. 168, 179 (1931); Kimball v. Lockwood & Smith, 6

R. I. 138 (1859).
x6. Stedman v. Gasset, 28 Vt. 346 (1846).
17. Mack v. Beeland Co., 21 Ala. App. 97, 105 So.
her, 93 Vt. 371, 107 At.

44

722

(925);

Trask v. Kelle-

486 (igig).

18. See note 4 supra. For a further collection of authorities see Note (1935)
L. J. 70i, n. 3.
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quate.'5 The mortgagee's remedies are ejectment or foreclosure 20 both of
which take time and allow the mortgagor to escape with the rents.2 1 Legislation seems to be the only logical means
of aiding the mortgagee 22 and
23
even this road is beset with difficulty.

Real Property-Attempted Creation of Tenancy by Entireties by
Conveyance from One Spouse to the Other-A husband conveyed to
his wife "an undivided one-half interest" in certain land, stipulating in
the deed that the purpose of the conveyance was to create a tenancy by
entireties therein.' A tax appeal by the Commonwealth hinged upon the
question of whether a tenancy by entireties had been created. 2 Held, that
a tenancy in common resulted because the unities of time and title were
lacdng, and further because the words of grant were not apt for creating
the desired estate." Walker's Estate, 340 Pa. 13, i6 A. (2d) 28 (194o).
It is generally accepted that as a prerequisite to the creation of a
tenancy by the entirety the spouses must have "one and the same interest
accruing by one and the same conveyance, commencing at one and the
same time, and held by one and the same undivided possession." 4 Accordingly, because a conveyance to one's self was impossible at common
law, the creation of such estate by any sort of direct conveyance from one
spouse presented serious logical difficulties,5 despite the increasing effect
ig. Rosenblatt B. & L. Ass'n v. Miller, 13 D. & C. 73 (Pa. 1929) ; Note
So U. oF PA. L. REV. 269, 274. See also Schlecht's Appeal, 6o Pa. 172 (1869).

(1931)

20. Where the mortgagor is the person receiving the rent, the mortgagee may
confess judgment on the warrant of attorney accompanying the bond and issue an
attachment execution against the. rent, making the tenant garnishee. Fisher v. McFarland, IIo Pa. Super. 184, 167 Atl. 377 (I933).
21. See Abelow, An. Historical Analysis of Assignments of Rents in New York
(1936) 6 BROOKLYN L. REv. 25, 52; Note (1933) 43 YALE L. J. lO7, io8; Note (1934)
8 TEMP. L. Q. 391.
22. See Rosenblatt B. & L. Ass'n v. Miller, 13 D. & C. 73, 76 (Pa. 1929) ; Note
(1931) 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 269, 274.
23. Ibid. as to the probable necessity of an amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution before this legislation would be effective.

I. The following recital in the deed immediately followed the words of grant:
"The parties hereto are husband and wife. The purpose of this conveyance by the parties hereto is to create an estate by entireties to the real estate hereinbefore described."
Brief for Appellant and Record, ga.
2. On the husband's death the Commonwealth assessed the undivided one-half of
the estate not conveyed as passing to his heirs and therefore subject to transfer inheritance tax. Under Pennsylvania statute accrual by survivorship in a tenancy by the
entireties is not subject to the transfer inheritance tax, see PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon,
Supp. 1940) tit. 72, § 2301 (e), although the rule is by no means uniform in other jurisdictions. See Note (1938) 17 N. C. L. REV. 71.
3. The grant purported to convey an undivided one-half interest. Since one feature
of the estate by the entireties is said to be that each tenant holds "per tout et non per
my", 2 BL. Comm. *182, the expressed purpose appears repugnant to the words of
grant. But see note ii infra. From a realistic viewpoint, however, it might rather
appear that what each tenant holds is a half interest lacking the right to alienate or
encumber it without consent of the other, together with an equal right to prevent
alienation or encumbrance of the half interest of the other. The distinction between
an undivided half of the whole, and the whole of an undivided half, 2 BL. CoMM. *182,
would seem a rather barren technicality.
4. The so-called unities of interest, title, time and possession. 2 BL Comm. *8o;
2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) §418. The tenancy by the entirety is
treated as essentially a type of joint estate, but with the added unity of husband and
wife causing different legal consequences to arise on its creation. See Madden v.
Gosztonyi Savings and Trust Co., 331 Pa. 476, 480, 481, 20o Atl. 624, 627 (1938).
5. The titles of husband and wife then would have vested at different times and by
different conveyances, whether the conveyance were of the whole estate to both spouses.
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given the expressed intent of the grantor in conveyances inter vivos subsequent to the Statute of Frauds.8 However, in Pennsylvania, a statute
validating transfers from a party to himself jointly with another 7 is held
to permit creation of the estate by a direct conveyance of the whole from
one spouse to both jointly.8 Other courts have gone farther and on
various theories allow such mode of creation of the estate in the absence
of the statute. In these latter jurisdictions, the technical requirements of
the unities having been already in some measure relaxed in order to
effectuate the intent of the parties, 10 a direct conveyance of half the interest
by one spouse to the other alone with a clear intent, as here, to create an
estate by the entireties might possibly be given effect. 1 But in Pennsylvania, where there has been little indication of any sloughing off of the
formalities incident to the creation of the estate,' 2 the instant result was
to have been expected. Little added convenience has been denied conveyancers by the decision. Vandergrift's Estate 13 provided a sufficiently
simple method for creating the desired estate from the property of one
Wright v. Knapp, 183 Mich. 656, 15o N. W. 315 (1915); Dutton v. Buckley, 116 Ore.
66r, 242 Pac. 626 (1926) 24 MicH. L. REV. 726; accord, Union Guardian Trust Co. v.
Vogt, 263 Mich. 330, 248 N. W. 639 (1933) ; or of a half interest direct from one
spouse to the other, Pegg v. Pegg, i65 Mich. 228, i3o N. W. 617 (19,1).
6. P~nmicic, PROPERTY (1939) 4o4.
7. Uniform Interparty Agreement Act, PA. STAT. AxN. (Purdon, i93i) tit. 69,
§ 541 et seq.
8. On the theory that the conveyance from the one spouse to the two operates to
divest the one of his entire estate and vests coequal estates, created by the same deed
at the same time, in both spouses. Vandergrift's Estate, io5 Pa. Super. 293, 161 Ati. 898
(1932) (Conveyance of property of wife to both spouses) ; York v. Scranton Lackawanna Trust Co., 8o Pittsb. Leg. J. 346 (C. P., Lackawanna Co., 1932) (conveyance
of husband's property to both spouses) ; accord, Lawton v. Lawton, 48 R. I. 134, 136
Atl. 241 (1927), where an intention that the parties hold as joint tenants was effectuated, joint tenancy in husband and wife being possible in Rhode Island. But cf. Ames
v. Chandler, 265 Mass. 428, 164 N. E. 616 (1929) for a contrary view as to entirety
estates, although the unities are here again concededly satisfied in that a joint estate is
created.
9. Johnson v. Landefeld, 138 Fla. 511, 189 So. 666 (1939) (evenly divided court);
Cadgene v. Cadgene, 124 N. J. L. 566, 12 A. (2d) 635 (ig4o), affirming unanimously,
Cadgene v. Cadgene, 37 N. J. Misc. 332, 8 A. (2d) 858 (Sup. Ct i939) ; Matter of
Klatzl, 216 N. Y. 83, iio N. E. 181 (1915), explained in Boehringer v. Schmid, 254
N. Y. 355, 173 N. E. 22o (193o).
io. "We believe the technical view should give way to the intention of the parties,"
Edmonds v. Comm'r, go F. (2d) i4; 16 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937). Note language in Coon
v. Campbell, 240 N. Y. Supp. 772 (Sup. Ct 1930) at 775. See 2 TIFANY, REAL
PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) 225. "Unity of title means that the estate of joint tenancy
must be created by the same act or instrument . . . the wife derived her title from
her grantor and the husband derived his from his wife. . . . But it is unity of title
in the joint tenancy with which we are concerned." Horler's Estate, i8o App. Div.
6o8, 612, 168 N. Y. Supp. 221, 223 (ist Dep't 1917).
ii. So in Matter of Farrand, 126 N. Y. Misc. 59o, 214 N. Y. Supp. 793 (Surr.
Ct. 1926), a result contra to that in the instant case was reached, though no New
York appellate court has yet ruled on the exact question. Cf. Horler's Estate, note
9 supra ("joint tenancy" created). "Clearly, a mere conveyance by the wife of
an undivided half interest would not create a joint tenancy. It is doubtful whether
an intent to create a joint tenancy, expressed in the habendurn clause, would be of
any avail, because the latter might be fairly held to be repugnant to the estate
granted. But in this deed in the porhon immediately following the description, the
nature and kind of the estate granted is described. . . ." Id. 611 and 223 respectively. (Italics supplied.) For the contrary technical view see Pegg v. Pegg, note
5 supra.
12. But note that in Vandergrift's Estate, note 8 supra, no mention of the unities
was made, perhaps an indication of a tendency to disregard them on the part of the
Superior Court.
13. Note 5 supra.
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spouse. 14 The decision is to be questioned, if at all, only insofar as it may
appear that the court, by allowing technical rules of conveyancing to over15
too
ride the clearly expressed purpose of the parties in the
17 instant case
law.
of
harshly penalizes 1 the widow for a mistake

Restraint of Trade-Price Raising "Unreasonable Per Se" Under
Sherman Act-Defendants, "major" 1 oil refiners, producing 83 per
cent. of the gasolene in the mid-continental area made a gentlemen's agreement to purchase at "spot" 2 prices "distress" 3 gasolene of independent producers. Retail prices, based on "spot" market rates, 4 rose and remained
static. Prosecuted under the Sherman Act, defendants submitted that their
program corrected a "competitive abuse" and restored "normal competition." Held, a combination which controls a substantial portion of an industry and regulates prices in interstate commerce in that industry is unreasonable per se, within the meaning of the Act. United States v. SoconyVacuum Oil Co. et al., 8 U. S. L. WEEK 771 (U. S. 1940).
14. The cumbersome prior method had been by conveyance to a straw man who
would immediately reconvey to the husband and wife jointly. See Basset v. Budlong,
77 Mich. 338, 347, 348, 43 N. W. 984, 986 (I889).
15. It would be difficult to discover any practical value in the rule that the unities must be satisfied where a clear intention to create the estate appears in the deed.
The court might possibly have ruled differently by holding the expressed intent
of the grantor in the explanatory clause to control the granting clause, Breidenthal
v. Grooms, I61 Okla. 74, 17 P. (2d) 688 (932); 4 TIFFANY, REA. PRoPiRTY (3d ed.
1939) p. 64 and § 981, and treating the deed as a conveyance of the whole estate
to both parties, thus lsatisfying the unities. But the Oklahoma case appears to stand
alone in allowing a clear granting clause to be overruled by a subsequent explanatory clause. See 4 TIFFANY, REAL PRoPmry (3d ed., 1939) § 98o. In Pennsylvania
particularly are the magic words of conveyance given precedence over intent of the
parties. See note 17 infra.
I6. The harshness of the result lies not in the assessment of the tax, but in the
fact that the husband's intestacy may well have occurred in reliance on the fact that
his widow would take by survivorship, and accordingly the estate may go as a
windfall to his heirs, while a major item in the security planned for his widow by
the decedent is denied her.
17. In most jurisdictions the survivor would have relief in equity by reformation of the deed on grounds of mistake of law as to the meaning of the instrument.
RESTATEMENT, CONAlexander v. Shephard, 146 Tenn. 9o, 24o S. W. 287 (i92);
TRACTs (1932) § 504. "It is sufficient that the parties have agreed to accomplish a
particular object by the instrument to be executed, and that the instrument as executed is insufficient to effectuate their intenion." S WnLzSTON, CONTRACTS (Rev.
ed. 1937) § 1585. However, the Pennsylvania rule is contrary. Clapp v. Hoffman,
'59 Pa. 531, 534, 28 A. 362, 363 (894) ; First Nat. Bank v. Rockefeller, 333 Pa.
536.
553, 559, 5 A. (2d) 205 (939); WALSH, EQUITY (930)
I. Majors comprise the economic giants of the petroleum industry. Closely integrated from the crude oil drilling to the retail distribution, these industrial leaders tend
largely to determine petroleum policies.
2. "Spot" markets constitute the wholesale transactions consumated at the refineries
and published in the Trade Journals.
3. "Distress" gasolene represents the excess which independent refiners "dumped"
on the market. This market depressant was caused by the "independent's" lack of permanent storage facilities for the crude oil which they were under a contractual duty to
purchase.
4. Jobbers' contract prices were expressly computed according to the current "spot"
market rate, while retail sales were commonly based on a 5Y2 cent addition to the "spot"
price list of Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, the area market leader.
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While the Sherman Act s applies solely to unreasonable restraints of
trade,6 United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.7 clearly branded price fixing
unreasonable as a matter of law. Even a reasonable price did not preclude
an unreasonable restraint if the market was artificially controlled by limiting supply. Power to fix and regulate markets rather than conjectural
fairness of price lay at the crux of the decision. 8 Federal courts originally
followed this "unreasonable per se" view, but later reverted to judging reasonableness by weighing ameliorating factors. 9 The majority opinion in
the instant case by its wholehearted endorsement of the reasoning in
Trenton Potteriesmarks a return to the fiction of an unrestrained economic
system.10 Although not explicitly abandoning the "Rule of Reason," the
court maintains it has no application to price control schemes. Restraintnot matter to what extent-obviates competition and thereby is, of itself,
unreasonable. The dissent is based on a somewhat forced distinction between price raising and price fixing.1 ' At present, a dilemma confronts the
courts. Uninhibited competition leads to trade evils and economic waste.

Allowing industrial self-government risks exploitation by the controlling
few. Despite dangers accompanying increased governmental control over
business, the wisest solution in so basic an industry 12 would be to :declare
it
3
a public utility subject to regulation by an appropriate commission.

Taxation-Income Taxes on the Realization of Future Interests-Beneficiary, upon reaching specified age, received his share of
the corpus of a testamentary trust. Held, as basis for income taxation, date
of acquisition was the date the beneficiary's contingent interest vested in
enjoyment. Reynolds v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 114 F. (2d)
804 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1940).
5. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. A. I (1929), as amended by 50 STAT. 693
(1937), 15 U. S. C. A. i (Supp. 1940).
6. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U. S. i (iII) ; United
States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. io6 (1911).
7. 273 U. S. 392 (1927).

This decision, however, only was the culmination of pre-

vious but less lucid opinions. Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U. S. 66 (97) ; United States
v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U. S. 29o (1897).
8. 49 YALE L. J. 761 (1940).
9. The Trade Association cases reveal that earlier decisions, i. e., United States v.
American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U. S. 371 (923) ; American Column and Lumber Co.
v. United States, 257 U. S. 377 (i92i), followed stringently the spirit of the Sherman
Act to foster unrestrained competition. However, the more recent rulings, i. e., Maple

Flooring Manufacturers' Ass'n v. United States, 268 U. S. 563 (925); Cement Mfr.'s
Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U. S. 588 (1925) ; see Richberg, The Monopoly
Issue (1939) 87 U. OF PA. L. REV. 375, 385, found an interchange of trade and price
practices beneficial to "healthy" competition; Donovan, The Effect of the Decision in
the Sugar Institute Case Upon Trade Association Activities (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L.
Ray. 929; Jaffee and Tobriner, The Legality of Price Fixing Agreements (1932) 45
HARV. L. REV. 1164. In Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S. 344 (1932)
judicial approval was obtained for an exclusive selling agency to alleviate a market
deflated by "distress dumping." The menace of potential power was discounted as
the court manifested satisfaction with lack of actual price control even though a general raising of the market level accompanied the cure through cooperative effort. This
trend reached a climax under the N. R. A. Petroleum Code, permitting price fixing
and immunizing its members from anti-trust prosecution.
io. i C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv. 1 lOO2 (8th ed. 1938).
ii. Also prominent in the dissenting opinion is reasoning based on such generalities as "competitive abuse" and "normal competition".
12. Petroleum assumed a position of paramount importance in view of the current
preparedness program.
13. For a critical analysis of the organization and problems of big business see
KEMNITZER, REBIRTH OF MONOPOLY (1938) ; (940)
49 YALE L. J. 761, 769.

RECENT CASES

Testator bequeathed property to wife, then to petitioner should she
outlive the wife. Held, date of acquisition was date of testator's death. Van
Vranken v. Helvering, 115 F. (2d) 7o9 (C. C. A. 2d, i94o).
Date of acquisition is the basis for computing gain or loss on a sale of
property acquired by will or inheritance.' It has usually been defined as the
date of the testator's death when the remainderman then acquired a vested
interest and the date his right vested if the remainderman acquired only a
contingent interest. 2 This legalistic distinction 3 introduced unpredictability
into the income tax field since the federal courts felt bound to recognize
local interpretations defining a particular remainder as vested or contingent.4 Interpretations varied even within the same jurisdiction.5 Attempts by Treasury Regulations 6 to establish as the basis the testator's
death in all cases were dismissed by the court as contrary to existing legislation 7 and judicial construction thereof." The Van Vranken case, while
i. This term first appeared in Regulations of the Revenue Act of 1918, U. S. Treas.
Reg. 45, Art. 1562, and was incorporated into every succeeding Revenue Act with the
exception of those of x928 and 1932. INT. REv. CODE, § 113 (a) (5) (940) ; Revenue
Act of 1936, § 113 (a) (5) ; Revenue Act of 1934, § 113 (a) (5) ; Revenue Act of 1926,
§ 2o4 (a) (5) ; Revenue Act of 1924, § 204 (a) (5) ; Revenue Act of i92i, § 2o2 (a) (3).
2. See 2 PAUl. & MERTNS, LAW OF FEDERL INCOTE TAXAION (1934) § 18.83.
This view became fortified by subsequent departmental rulings: I. T. 1622, I-I Cum.
BULL. 135, 138 (1923) ; I. T. II65, I-i Cum. Bur.. 30 (1922) ; 0. D. 1136, 5 Cum.
BULL. 56 (1921) ; 0. D. 727, 3 Cum. BULL. 53 (1920) ; 0. D. 694, 3 CuM. BuL.L. 53
(1920) ; Sol. Op. 35,
Cum. BuL. 50 (i920) ; cf. G. C. M. io26o, IX-i Cu . BuLL.
C
79, 97 (I932), where it was said: ". .
the distinction between interests which are
technically contingent and interests which are technically vested, subject to being divested should in general be ignored. . . . The question is whether the taxpayer has
acquired sufficiently substantial ownership, .
. . and in general, an interest which is
vested, subject to being divested, does not give a taxpayer that sort of ownership."
3. The rule appears to have been derived from the case of Brewster v. Gage, 28o
U. S. 327 (0930), which held that residuary legatees, since they had a present, indefeasible vested interest in the property of the testator upon his death, "acquired the
property" as of that date. When cases involving the bequeathing or devising of future
estates appeared, the courts took their analogy to the Brewster case by rationalizing
that for tax purposes the position of a vested remainderman after a life estate created
by Will was similar to that of a residuary legatee with a vested interest, and that the
period of the intervening estate was comparable to the period of administration. This
same type of reasoning persisted in situations whereby property was left by will in
trust for B and at the termination of the trust the corpus turned over to C. It was
held that the period of the trust was also analogous to the period of administration.
Huggett v. Burnet, 64 F. (2d) 705 (App. D. C. 1933) ; Chandler v. Field, 63 F. (2d)
13 (C. C. A. Ist, 1933), aff'd on rehearing, 63 F. (2d) 13 (C. C. A. 1st, 1933), cert.
denied, 289 U. S. 758 (1933); William Huggett, 24 B. T. A. 669 ([931); Francis
Abeles, 24 B. T. A. 435 (1g3i) ; Rodman E. Griscom, 22 B. T. A. 979 (ig3). But see
Lane v. Corwin, 63 F. (2d) 767, 770 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933), cert. denied, 29o U. S. 644
(I933).

However, all this did not clearly indicate the method of handling cases involving
contingent interests. See Warner v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 72 F. (2d)
225, 228 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934) ; Pringle v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 64 F. (2d)
863, 864 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 656 (933).
Peculiarly enough, therefore, the subsequent decisions failed to accord both interests
similar treatment.
4. Blair v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 30o U. S. 5 (933) ; Uterhard v.
United States, 240 U. S. 598, 603 (x916). See also Note
(936) 49 HARv. L. REv. 462;
Developments in the Law-Taxation (934) 47 HAv. L. REv. 1209, 1271.
5. MAGML, TAXABLE INCOME (1936) 388.
6. U. S. Treas. Reg. 86, Art. 113 (a) (5) (b).
7. Reynolds v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 114 F. (2d) 804, 811 (1940).
A few Board decisions prior to the Reynolds case did tend to follow the Regulations.
Richard Archbold, 4o B. T. A. 1238 (1939) ; Elizabeth G. Augustus, 4o B. T. A. 1201
(i939) ; cf. Elsie Van Vranken, 4o B. T. A. 956 (1939).
8. See National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U. S. 140, 146 (919) ; United
States v. Cerecedo Hermanos, 209 U. S. 337, 339 (1908) ; United States v. G. Folk &
Bro., 2o4 U. S. 143, 152 (197o).
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finally adopting the practical view taken by these Treasury Regulations, 9
failed to decide which basic valuation was to be employed: the value of the
property,1 0 or the value of the remainderman's interest obtained by deducting from the value of the property, the worth of the life tenant's interest."
It is of the essence of any future interest that it increases in value as the
intervening estate draws to an end, often even though the value of the
physical property decreases.' 2 This increment, which constitutes a taxable
gain, is disregarded if the value of the property rather than the value of
the interest in the property is used.18 However, evaluation of a future interest in property presents practical difficulties in computing the life tenant's
interest. The approximate nature of mortality tables, 4 the reluctance of
courts to refine that approximation by considering such factors as the
health or occupation of the life tenant, 5 together with the unpredictability
of rates of income render mathematical precision impossible.' 6 Evaluation
of the remainderman's interest by hindsight has generally been rejected by
the courts.' 7 Nevertheless, the fact that this interest is satisfactorily evaluated in estate and inheritance tax fields proves that the difficulty is not
insurmountable. The objection has been raised that the government realizes
an unjust benefit if the value of the interest is used, since no deduction is
allowed the preceding tenant for the wasting nature of his right.' 8 Although
this may justify reform in taxing estates and trusts, it does not require rejection of the value of the interest as the basis for income tax.
9. The court reluctantly failed to follow the Reynolds case, but felt that in view
of the desirable trends in other fields of taxation to abolish antiquated property concepts, the same tendency should apply to the instant problem. E. g., Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. io6, 118 (ig4o).
Io. Huggett v. Burnet, 64 F. (2d) 705 (App. D. C. 1933) ; Chandler v. Field, 63
F. (2d) 13 (C. C. A. 1st, 1933) ; Grace L. Wright, 29 B. T. A. 1033 (934) ; Henry
A. Cleland Estate Co., Ltd., 29 B. T. A. 436 (1933) ; Rodman E. Griscom, 22 B. T. A.
979 (931).
See also 2 PAUL & MERTE S, oP. cit. supra note 2, § 18.84.
ii. Elizabeth S. Vale, 3o B. T. A. 1351 (934); William Huggett, 24 B. T. A. 669
(1931).
12. But cf. S. M. 4640, V-i Cum. BULL 6o (1926), where the value of a'contingent
remainder was destroyed as a result of fire, but was not permitted as a deductible loss
for income tax purposes.
13. Take a hypothetical case. A dies leaving property to B for life with remainder
to C. The physical assets at the time of A's death are worth $ro,ooo, which value is
assumed to remain constant throughout this case. Calculated on the basis of mortality
tables B's interest is worth $6,ooo. C's remainder interest at the date of A's death is
therefore $4,ooo. The day before B dies, C's interest will then reflect solely the value
of the physical assets which is still $io,ooo. If C at that moment sells his remainderman
interest for $io,ooo, he has a taxable profit of $6,ooo representing the difference between the selling price and the value of the remainder interest at A's death, which was
$4,ooo. However, if instead C waits until one day after B dies, then takes the physical
assets and sells them for $io,ooo he would then have no taxable gain, says the majority
view, since his basis would be the value of the physical assets at the date of A's death,
which was also $io,ooo.
14. Although the courts have sanctioned the use of mortality tables [Ithaca Trust
Co. v. United States, 279 U. S. 15i (1929) ; cf. Union Trust Co. v. Heiner, i9 F. (2d)
362 (1927)] the practice leaves much to be desired from the standpoint of the remainderman. Whatever the value of these tables may be when dealing with probabilities of
large groups, the margin of error becomes large when dealing with one particular individual. Note (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1354 . (The problem of valuing a life tenant's interest for estate and inheritance taxation is the same as that involved in income taxation.)
15. 2 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERY (937)

741.

I6. Id. at 74o. A moment's speculation concerning the valuation of contingent remainders should be sufficiently convincing that the calculation defies ascertainment and
any resulting figure is nearly meaningless. Id. at 744.
17. Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U. S. [I, i55 (i929). For further discussion of this proposed method see 2 BONBOIGHT, op. Cit. supra note i5, at 742; Note
(1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1354, 1362 (objection to this method for estate and inheritance
taxation).
i8. Maguire, Income Taxes on the Realization of Future Interests (1922) 31 YALE
L. J. 367, 371-374.

